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A better understanding of high-cost kidney transplant
patients would be useful for informing value-based
purchasing strategies by payers. This retrospective co-
hort study was based on the Medicare Provider Anal-
ysis and Review (MEDPAR) files from 2003 to 2006.
The focus of this analysis was high-cost kidney trans-
plant patients (patients that qualified for Medicare
outlier payments and 30-day readmission payments).
Using regression techniques, we explored relation-
ships between high-cost kidney transplant patients,
center-specific case mix, and center quality. Among
43 393 kidney transplants in Medicare recipients, 35.2%
were categorized as high-cost patients. These pay-
ments represented 20% of total Medicare payments
for kidney transplantation and exceeded $200 mil-
lion over the study period. Case mix was associated
with these payments and was an important factor un-
derlying variation in hospital payments high-cost pa-
tients. Hospital quality was also a strong determinant
of future Medicare payments for high-cost patients.
Compared to high-quality centers, low-quality centers
cost Medicare an additional $1185 per kidney trans-
plant. Payments for high-cost patients represent a sig-
nificant proportion of the total costs of kidney trans-
plant surgical care. Quality improvement may be an
important strategy for reducing the costs of kidney
transplantation.
Key words: Economics, financial analysis, quality of
care, transplantation outcomes
Received 29 October 2008, revised 12 December 2008
and accepted for publication 17 January 2009
Introduction
Kidney transplantation is expensive. The costs of an
uncomplicated renal transplant event are approximately
$100 000 for the first in 90 days of care (1,2). CMS is
the primary payer for most of kidney transplant patients
and though kidney transplantation is cost effective com-
pared to long-term dialysis, kidney transplant recipients
consume significant healthcare resources (3). CMS spends
$27 billion/year on the care of renal failure patients, and ap-
proximately 13% of this amount is for kidney transplantat-
ion (4).
Reducing adverse outcomes following kidney transplanta-
tion may be one strategy for reducing these high costs.
Clearly, payments associated with adverse surgical out-
comes represent a significant expense for CMS (5,6). For
example, postkidney transplant sepsis the costs insurers
$48 000, posttransplant pneumonia costs insurers $38 000
and postkidney transplant urinary complications are asso-
ciated with $28 000 of additional insurer costs (1,2,7). Sig-
nificant variation among hospitals in outcomes suggests
opportunities to avoid excess costs associated with ad-
verse outcomes and high-cost patients (8,9).
In this context, we studied Medicare payments associ-
ated with high-cost patients following the kidney transplant
event. We focused on two specific sources of Medicare
payments, 30-day readmission payments to hospitals and
outlier payments. The link between adverse outcomes and
30-day readmissions is clear. Although less well known,
outlier payments may be equally as important. Medicare
outlier payment and 30-day readmission policies are de-
signed to promote access to care for extremely costly
patients. It remains unclear the degree to which these
policies are supporting high-risk patients compared to poor-
quality care.
Within this context, the goals of this article include:
(i) Describe the epidemiology of Medicare payments for
high-cost patients in kidney transplantation.
(ii) Describe the relationship between these all payments
and both measures of high-risk patients and poor
quality.
Methods
Subjects and data bases
This study was based on the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MED-
PAR) files from 2003 to 2006. Because services provided to Medicare man-
aged care patients are not consistently captured in the MEDPAR files, such
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patients were excluded from our study (<1% of kidney transplant recipi-
ents). Patients undergoing isolated kidney transplant (living and deceased
donor) were identified using the procedure codes from the International
Classification of Diseases, version 9. Medicare was identified as the pri-
mary payer for all patients with claims of $15 000 or greater for the kidney
transplant event (10).
Determining payments for adverse events
A high proportion of the costs of kidney transplantation are from payments
to hospitals for the single kidney transplant diagnosis-related group (DRG).
DRG payments were devised under the prospective payment system to
bundle payments for hospitals for the care of a patient with a particular
diagnosis. Importantly, there is a single DRG for kidney transplantation that
cannot be adjusted for illness severity or case complexity.
For the purposes of this analysis, we identified two additional types of pay-
ments in addition to DRG payments. Hospitals may receive payments for
readmissions and outlier payments, both of which are associated with ad-
verse outcomes. Readmission payments, outlier payments and payments
for adverse events are defined as:
Readmission payments: Payments made to hospitals for any admission
within 30 days of the kidney transplant operation.
Outlier payments: How Medicare pays hospitals for unusually expensive
cases. Medicare identifies outlier kidney transplant cases by comparing the
estimated costs for the case to a fixed loss threshold that is specific to DRG
302 (approximately $45 000 for kidney transplant). Once a case qualifies as
an outlier, the hospital is reimbursed as a fixed percentage of submitted
charges. Importantly, DRG 302 is not modifiable for case complexity. The
presence of an outlier payments and the associated amount is specifically
identified in Medicare claims.
High-cost patients: The sum of the total readmission payments and out-
lier payments following kidney transplantation.
We first quantified payments for high-cost patients in kidney transplan-
tation, as a proportion of total Medicare payments. We calculated the per-
centage of cases associated with such payments, the mean amount of each
payment, and the ratio of these payments to total Medicare payments.
We then examined the extent to which payments for high-cost patients
are associated with specific patient and hospital characteristics. Additional
patient level clinical data was obtained from MEDPAR, including age at
transplant, sex, race, donor source (living or deceased) and comorbidities
(11). Provider level data were collected, including hospital teaching status
and kidney transplant operative volume (ranked in terciles). A patient level
analysis was done using a multivariable logistic regression model with the
outlier payment status as the dependant variable (measured as a binary
variable) and the covariates mentioned above as the independent variables.
Another model was created with 30-day readmission payment status as
the dependent variable.
Variation in payments across hospitals
We then assessed variation in rates of payments for high-cost patients
among hospitals. For this analysis we calculated the proportion of total
hospital payments that were attributable to high-cost patients (2003–2006).
Though data in this analysis were not explicitly adjusted for differences
in pricing across regions and hospitals, our reliance on the ratio of adverse
outcome payments to total payments implicitly deals with price adjustment.
We then investigated the relationship between payments for high-cost pa-
tients and hospital case mix (illness severity of kidney transplant recip-
ients and donor source). For this analysis, we first ranked hospitals by
predicted mortality. Predicted mortality was derived by creating a multiple
logistic regression equation using the following dependant variables: pa-
tient characteristics (age, race, sex, comorbidities and donor source) and
hospital characteristics (transplant volume and teaching status) (12,13).
Comorbidities were identified by ICD-9 codes and we used the meth-
ods of Elixhauser to adjust for these comorbidities at the patient level
(11). We then related hospital predicted risk of mortality (our measure
of case mix) to two center-specific outcome measures: the proportion of
cases qualifying for payments for high-cost patients and the proportion
of hospital reimbursement from payments for high-cost patients. Hospi-
tals were then ranked and sorted into terciles according to case mix. We
then assessed relationships between hospital case mix and to two center-
specific outcome measures: the proportion of kidney transplant cases
qualifying for payments for high-cost patients and the proportion of hos-
pital reimbursement from payments for high-cost patients following kidney
transplantation.
Using similar methods, we assessed associations between hospital qual-
ity and Medicare payments for high-cost patients. To characterize hospital
quality, we used a previously validated composite measure (14,15). In brief,
this measure was created by using an empirical Bayes approach to com-
bine two important domains of quality: risk-adjusted 30-day mortality and
center-specific kidney transplant volume. The weight placed on each input
varied across hospitals, with more weight placed on 30-day mortality when
it was measured reliably (i.e. hospitals have higher caseloads). The remain-
ing weight was then placed on hospital volume. The risk adjusted mortality
was calculated as above. We then calculated the ‘volume predicted mortal-
ity’ by shrinkage of the observed mortality rate back toward the mortality
rate expected given the volume at that hospital. The combined measure
was calculated as follows: composite mortality prediction = (weight) ×
(observed mortality) + (1 – weight) × (volume – predicted mortality). This
approach ensures an optimal combination of these two measures, as the di-
rect measure (adjusted mortality) is weighted to the extent it is reliable, and
the proxy measure (volume) is weighted only to the extent necessary. Hos-
pitals were then ranked and sorted into terciles according to this composite
measure of quality. Using multiple linear regression techniques, we then
related hospital predicted risk of mortality (our measure of case mix) to two
center-specific outcome measures: the proportion of cases qualifying for
payments for adverse events and the proportion of hospital reimbursement
from payments for high-cost patients.
Since mortality is a significant component of our composite measure for
quality, and these patients may be more likely to qualify as high-cost pa-
tients, assessing payments and quality on contemporaneous data samples
would result in spuriously strong correlation between the two measures.
As a result, hospital quality was characterized based on data from 2003 to
2004, and Medicare payments for high-cost patients were reported using
data from 2005 to 2006.
All statistical analyses were conducted using STATA 10.0 (College Station,
TX). This study was judged exempt by the Institutional Review Board at the
University of Michigan.
Results
Determining payments for adverse events
A total of 43 393 kidney transplants were completed on
Medicare recipients during the study period (2003–2006).
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Table 1: Medicare payments for high-cost kidney transplant patients (N = 43 393)
Outlier 30-day readmission
payments payments Total
Total # patients 2894 12 384 15 278
Percentage of patients 6.7 28.5 35.2
Mean payment $29 579 $9962 $13 678
Proportion of total Medicare payments 8.2 11.8 20.0
Total payments $85 602 000 $123 363 000 $208 965 000
As described in Table 1, 6.7% of kidney transplant patients
qualified for Medicare outlier payments with a mean out-
lier payment amount of $29 579. Outlier payments repre-
sented 8.2% of total Medicare payments for the kidney
transplant event. In addition, 28.5% of kidney transplant
recipients had payments for a readmission within 30 days
and the mean payment for this readmission from Medicare
was $9962. Over the study period, Medicare paid kidney
hospitals over $200 million in payments for high-cost pa-
tients, representing 20.0% of Medicare payments for the
kidney transplant event.
Patient characteristics had a significant effect on the like-
lihood of outlier payments (Table 2). Specifically, black pa-
tients and patients with more comorbidities were more
likely to qualify for outlier payments. In addition, recipients
of living donor kidney transplants were less likely to receive
outlier payments. Similarly, patient-specific characteristics
had a significant effect on the rates of 30-day readmission
payments. Black patients and patients with more comor-
bidities were more likely to be readmitted within 30 days.
In addition, recipients of living donor kidney transplants
were less likely to require a readmission.
Hospital teaching status did not significantly affect rates
of outlier payments. Conversely, patients who received
their kidney transplant at a teaching institution were more
likely to be readmitted within 30 days of the transplant.
Table 2: Patient and hospital demographics by outlier payment status or readmission status for kidney transplantation (MEDPAR 2005–
2006)
Outlier payments status Readmission status
Patients Patients Patients Patients
with outlier without outlier with 30-day without 30-day
Demographics payment payment OR (95% CI) readmission readmission OR (95% CI)
Number of patients 1663 20 889 NA NA 6420 16 132 NA NA
Patient characteristics
Age (% 65+ years) 18.1 17.9 1.03 (0.89, 1.18) 18.6 17.7 1.07 (0.99, 1.16)
Sex (% female) 40.5 38.8 1.06 (0.95, 1.18) 39.5 38.8 1.01 (0.95, 1.07)
Race (% black) 33.1 26.6 1.32 (1.17, 1.48) 30.8 25.7 1.22 (1.14, 1.31)
Comorbidity (% >2) 50.1 46.3 1.12 (1.01, 1.24) 51.7 44.5 1.32 (1.25, 1.41)
Living donor (%) 23.0 30.3 0.71 (0.63, 0.81) 24.3 31.9 0.72 (0.67, 0.77)
Provider characteristics
Teaching (%) 77.1 76.7 0.99 (0.87, 1.13) 79.2 75.7 1.15 (1.07, 1.24)
Hospital volume tercile 1 35.7 33.6 Reference 32.1 34.4 Reference
2 34.7 33.5 0.92 (0.81, 1.05) 35.1 33.0 1.13 (1.05, 1.22)
3 29.7 32.9 0.90 (0.79, 1.03) 32.8 32.7 1.10 (1.01, 1.19)
There were nonsignificant trends suggesting lower rates
of outlier payments among higher-volume kidney hospitals
(>50 Medicare cases per year). Patients that received a kid-
ney transplant at a medium (between 25 and 50 Medicare
cases per year) and high-volume hospitals were more likely
to require 30-day readmission compared to low-volume
hospitals (<25 Medicare cases per year).
Variation in payments across hospitals
Among kidney hospitals, there was significant variation
in the average proportion of total Medicare payments at-
tributable to high-cost patients (Figure 1). The proportion
of patients qualifying for payments for high-cost patients
ranged across hospitals, from 5% to 50%.
We then assessed the relationship between hospital case
mix and payments for high-cost patients. Hospital case
mix was stratified by terciles (ranging from high risk to
low risk) and then related to the proportion of cases that
qualified for payments for high-cost patients (Figure 2).
Hospitals with the highest risk case mix had the highest
proportion of cases that qualified as high-cost patients.
Similarly, hospital case mix was stratified by terciles and
then related to the proportion of hospital reimbursement
from payments for high-cost patients (Figure 3). Hospitals
with the highest risk case mix had the highest proportion
of hospital reimbursement from payments for high-cost
patients.
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Figure 1: The proportion of to-
tal costs attributable to high-
cost patients; the distribution
across US hospitals.
We then assessed the relationship between historical hos-
pital performance (hospital quality 2003–2004) and future
payments for high-cost patients (2005–2006). Hospital per-
formance was stratified by terciles (ranging from low qual-
ity to high quality) and then related to the proportion of
cases that qualified for payments for high-cost patients
(Figure 2). Similar to the hospitals with the highest risk
case mix, hospitals of the lowest historical performance
had the highest future proportion of cases that qualified
for payments for high-cost patients. Then, hospital quality
was stratified by terciles and related to the proportion of
hospital reimbursement from payments for high-cost pa-
tients (Figure 3). Similar to hospitals with the highest risk
case mix, hospitals with the lowest historical performance
had the highest future proportion of hospital reimburse-
ment from payments for high-cost patients.
Overall, hospitals determined to be low quality in 2003–








































































Hospital Case Mix 2005-06 Hospital Quality 2003-04
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Figure 2: The relationship
between kidney hospital-
specific case mix, quality and
the proportion of cases which
qualify for payments for
high-cost patients across US
hospitals. For comparisons of
case mix, ∗indicates p < 0.001
compared to hospitals with a
high case mix risk profile. For
comparisons of hospital quality,
∗indicates p < 0.001 compared
to hospitals with low measures
of quality.
was $1185 larger than the average payments made to high-
quality centers in 2005–2006.
Discussion
Medicare payments for high-cost patients (outlier and 30-
day readmission payments) represent a significant propor-
tion of a total cost of kidney transplant surgical care in
the United States. Among kidney hospitals, there is sig-
nificant variation in the rates of these payments. High-
risk patients were more likely to qualify for these pay-
ments and hospitals with more high-risk patients received
larger payments. Upon adjusting for these differences
in case mix, historically high-performing hospitals had
lower rates of payments for adverse outcomes in the fu-
ture. This finding suggests that hospital quality has sig-
nificant impact on Medicare reimbursements in kidney
transplantation.
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* * *
Figure 3: The relationship between kidney hospital-specific case mix, quality and the proportion of hospital reimbursement
from payments for high-cost patients across US hospitals. For comparisons of case mix, ∗ indicates p < 0.001 compared to hospitals
with high-risk case mix risk profile. For comparisons of hospital quality, ∗ indicates p < 0.001 compared to hospitals with low measures
of quality.
There is little previous work in transplantation focusing on
the relationship between quality and costs. Clearly, post-
operative complications have been linked to increased hos-
pital costs (16–19). Similarly, variations in case mix such as
donor quality or recipient burden of illness have been asso-
ciated with hospital costs (20–22). Unfortunately, previous
work investigating the financial implications of adverse out-
comes and high-cost patients have been limited to single
institutions, thus center quality could not be assessed.
Outlier payments and payments for 30-day readmission
can, in part be considered ‘excess’ costs to Medicare,
and would potentially be significantly impacted by quality
improvement initiatives. Our observation that high-quality
hospitals have low payments for high-cost patients is per-
haps not surprising. High-quality hospitals may have fewer
patients requiring reoperation, dialysis, prolonged length
of stay, intensive care or interventions that might results
in outlier payments and readmissions. Nonetheless, our
work is among the first to demonstrate a direct relation-
ship between hospital quality and payments in kidney
transplantation.
Our study has several important limitations. First, this anal-
ysis was based on Medicare claims data. Certainly, this
administrative data has limitations in capturing clinical vari-
ables, and as a result we may underestimate the impact of
illness severity on payments for high-cost patients. For ex-
ample, we adjust only for living donor and deceased donor,
and do not adjust the significant variation in the quality of
deceased donor grafts (20). Previous work has suggested
that there is little variation in hospital case mix for other
surgical procedures, but this has not been shown in trans-
plantation (23). Similarly, this analysis is limited to a single
payer (Medicare) and can not be generalized to private pay-
ers. That having been said, considering Medicare’s role as
the primary payer for the majority of kidney transplants in
the United States, our findings are likely to inform policy
makers. Presumably, most hospitals bill for services ren-
dered, but variation in billing practices may affect hospital
outlier payment rates. We are unable to control for these
variations. Second, we used the word quality in a very nar-
row sense, not considering the multidimensional nature of
this measure within the context of transplantation. More
specifically, we have focused on only one domain of hos-
pital quality, operative (30 day) mortality. Other measures
of quality, such as complication rates, graft function rates,
or waitlist mortality, or quality of life measures, may be
even more predictive of center performance. Future anal-
yses will focus on developing a more robust composite
measure of hospital quality. Our composite measure is
better in capturing systematic variation and forecasting fu-
ture hospital performance than individual quality indicators
(e.g. volume, risk-adjusted mortality alone). To the extent
that this composite remains an imperfect proxy of hospital
quality, however, our study may underestimate the relation-
ship between quality and payments for high-cost patients.
Nonetheless, these data do suggest that better measures
of quality may not only discriminate hospitals based on
quality, but they may also be useful in selecting lower-cost
hospitals. Third, perioperative payments are only portion
of the costs associated with kidney transplantation, and
assessment of total costs, over longer periods of time and
including the costs of long-term dialysis, would be essen-
tial. Similarly, it is important to note that poor quality will af-
fect more than just payments for adverse outcomes. These
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patients will presumably also require additional resources
to pay for outpatient care, home health care and extended
care facilities after discharge. None of these payments by
Medicare have been quantified in this analysis.
As Medicare pursues value-based purchasing strategies in
kidney transplantation, understanding the relationship be-
tween quality and costs will be paramount. On one hand, it
is plausible that higher quality could, in fact, lead to higher
costs. For example, hospitals may have better outcomes
related to closer surveillance or more testing, all of which
have real costs. If so, and costs were directly associated
with quality, this would imply the need for payers to make
explicit trade-offs, balancing both quality and costs. On
the other hand, our analysis suggests that the alternative
hypothesis is valid and that value-based purchasing strate-
gies built around optimizing quality may also reduce costs.
Moreover, the findings of our work suggest a viable busi-
ness case for quality improvement at all kidney hospitals in
the United States. Within this context, selective contract-
ing for kidney transplant care at ‘centers of excellence’
could lead to cost savings, assuming that accurate mea-
sures of ‘excellence’ are employed. Unfortunately, center
of excellent models may affect access to kidney transplant
care for some candidates. Another potential model for qual-
ity improvement involves a systematic identification of best
practices. More specifically, a comparison of the practices
at the highest performing centers compared to lowest per-
forming centers may elucidate specific practice patterns
associated with high quality and efficient kidney transplant
care. Another approach to quality improvement in kidney
transplantation involves higher payments by Medicare to
centers with the best performance. Unfortunately, Medi-
care demonstration projects using ‘pay for performance’
strategies have been questionably effective.
An attractive model for quality improvement in kidney
transplantation involves a Medicare funded ‘pay for par-
ticipation’ program. In short, Medicare would offer a pre-
mium to the DRG 302 for hospitals who participates in
a regional or national quality improvement collaborative.
This premium would in part fund additional data report-
ing on specific process and outcome measures. Regional
quality improvement collaboratives have been successful
in cardiac surgery in Northern New England, and general
surgery in Michigan (24,25). Quality collaboratives in trans-
plantation would not require comprehensive reform of cur-
rent fee structures and would be unlikely to reduce access
to kidney transplantation for high-risk populations (25,26).
Overall, a collaborative focusing on improving kidney trans-
plant may offer significant opportunities to improve quality
while reducing costs.
In summary, Medicare payments for high-cost patients
made to hospitals following kidney transplantation repre-
sent a significant portion of the costs of kidney transplant
surgery. As expected, payments for adverse event or more
likely, in cases of high-risk patients. Just as much if not
even to a larger degree, payments for high-cost patients
are linked to variations in hospital quality. As a result, cur-
rent Medicare payment policies for adverse events are not
only supporting the care of high-risk kidney transplant re-
cipients, as they should, but they are also supporting poor-
quality care. Thus, efforts aimed at quality improvement
could reduce Medicare costs by reducing payments for
adverse perioperative outcomes to hospitals. Further re-
search should focus on broader and longer-term measures
of kidney transplant costs and quality and utilize more ro-
bust data sets.
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